A great deal of effort from Governments and Non-Governmental Organisations went into negotiating the Arms Trade Treaty, concluded in New York in 2013. I am sceptical whether the Treaty, if it comes into force (for this to happen 18 states still need to ratify it) will be effective. I very much hope my scepticism will be unfounded.
Many exaggerated claims have been made about the likely utility and effectiveness of the Arms Trade Treaty. One example is the British Government’s claim about the efficacy of the Treaty in combating corruption, a major problem in the international arms trade. In its most recent completed inquiry, Parliament’s Committee on Arms Export Controls recommended the British Government
provides its assessment as to whether the provisions of the now concluded Arms Trade Treaty will be of any practical help in combating bribery and corruption in the international arms trade. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 155-159.)
The British Government responded
It is the Government’s assessment that by establishing internationally agreed standards for transfers of conventional arms and through international reporting, the Arms Trade Treaty will be of practical help in combating bribery and corruption in the international arms trade
No further detail is provided. So let’s take a closer look at what basis there might be for such a statement. The obvious place to start is the text of the Treaty itself.
The first thing we notice is that preventing or deterring corruption is not among the objects or purposes of the Treaty (see Article 1).
The standards of transfers required under the Treaty are set out in several articles. In summary:
- Article 6 (Prohibition): corruption is not mentioned
- Article 7 (Export and Export Assessment): corruption is not mentioned
- Article 8 (Import): corruption is not mentioned
- Article 9 (Transit or trans-shipment): corruption is not mentioned
- Article 10 (Brokering): corruption is not mentioned
- Article 11 (Diversion): here the Treaty says that “in order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms” States are “encouraged” to share information which “may” include “information on illicit activities including corruption”.
Record keeping is covered by Articles 12 and 13, but corruption is not mentioned here, and so states are under no obligation to do anything to keep records relating to corruption, nor are they “encouraged” to do any such record keeping.
Article 15(6) does directly address the topic of corruption and says “State Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1) becoming subject to corrupt practices”. How they might do so is left unsaid.
This simple examination of the Treaty text shows the British Government’s view is not credible. Plainly a Treaty which does not require states to do anything with regard to corruption, to take it into account when permitting the export of arms under the Treaty’s standards, or to do any reporting of it, is of no “practical help in combating bribery and corruption in international trade”. Nor is an “encouragement” in the Treaty (no one is designated to do the “encouraging”) to cooperate in unspecified ways or share unspecified information of any practical help to anyone.
Just in case we have missed something, let’s now also look at the reality of the international arms trade, using publicly available sources, to see what “practical help” the Treaty might be in combating bribery and corruption in international trade.
According to the Arms Transfers Database maintained by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2013 the top 20 arms exporting countries were responsible for 98 per cent of the world’s arms transfers. Of these 20 countries, only 4 have not so far ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which contains far more comprehensive and practical measures to combat bribery and corruption in international trade than the Arms Trade Treaty. Four countries have not ratified the Anti-Bribery Convention (because they are not OECD members) – China (3rd biggest arms exporter), Ukraine (10th), Belarus (12th), and Romania (18th). However, as stated in the most recent Annual Report of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, China has been attending meetings of the OECD Working Group on Bribery and enacted a law against foreign bribery in 2011.
The 16 countries that have ratified the Anti-Bribery Convention were responsible for 89 per cent of the world’s arms transfers. So in other words, almost all the world’s arms transfers in 2013 originated in countries that are already signed up to anti-bribery standards far more specific than anything in the Arms Trade Treaty. Nothing in the Arms Trade Treaty will improve on the requirements of the Anti-Bribery Convention, and therefore the Treaty can have no effect in combating bribery and corruption on the supply side.
Now let’s turn to the demand side and the top 20 importers. These countries import 78 per cent of the world’s conventional arms. When we look at Transparency International’s ratings of the risk of corruption in arms procurement in these states we note that bribery and corruption is still a major problem in the international arms trade. In these top 20 top importing countries, Transparency International rates the risk of corruption in arms procurement as follows:
- Critical (2 states): Egypt and Syria
- Very high (4 states): Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Oman and Venezuela
- High (8 states): India, the United Arab Emirates, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Thailand and Israel
- Low (3 states): the United States, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom
Three states have no rating – Azerbaijan, Vietnam and Myanmar. However, out of 177 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2013), where having the top ranking means being the “cleanest” country, Vietnam comes 116th, Azerbaijian 127th and Myanmar 157th. It is reasonable to suppose that were it possible for Transparency International to rate them for the risk of corruption in arms procurement, they would earn a rating of “critical”, “very high”, or “high”.
Now the “standards for transfers” in the Arms Trade Treaty will only affect states deciding whether to permit an arms transfer. So the only way importing States can help is through “international reporting” or “cooperation” with exporting States. They might help, for example, in cooperating with criminal investigations or in assisting in due diligence processes. However, this is highly unlikely to happen as only 4 out of the top 20 importing states have even signed the Treaty. Of these states only one has ratified the Arms Trade Treaty – the United Kingdom – rated as a state where the risk of corruption in arms procurement is “low”.
In other words the British Government’s view that the Arms Trade Treaty will be of “practical help” in combating “bribery and corruption in the international arms trade” is no more than, to put it at its kindest, wishful and naïve thinking. There is nothing in the text of the Treaty nor the structure of the international arms market which suggests that the Treaty could have any impact on arms trade corruption.